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LOCATING BIG LAWS IN SMALL PLACES:  
A REVIEW 
   
Tsegaye R Ararssa ♣ 
Michael Burgess and G Alan Tarr, eds. (2012), Constitutional Dynamics in 
Federal Systems: Sub-national Perspectives (Montreal and Kingston: Forum of 
Federations and McGill, Queen’s University Press) 338 +xii pages. 
One of the consequences of having a federal system in place is the potential 
availability of the opportunity for dual constitutionalism, the co-existence of 
federal and sub-national constitutions side by side. Federalizing a formerly 
unitary state (often referred to as federation by devolution, or holding-together 
federations) leads to the ‘creation’ or the vacation of some spaces for what I 
choose to call ‘big laws in smaller places’. Thus, constituent units that hardly 
had powers to generate their own laws come to claim the opportunity to make 
such laws including basic and fundamental laws such as their own constitutions. 
This ‘space’ vacated by the ‘national’ state of formerly unitary states or left to 
constituent units by a newly formed (aggregated) federal states has increasingly 
come to be referred to as ‘sub-national constitutional space’.1 The sub-national 
constitutional space is a realm in which the right to one’s own constitution (i.e., 
the right to constitutional texts, institutions, processes, and constitutional 
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1 Articles and collected essays edited in a book in recent years incude, but not limited to 
the following: Tarr, ‘Explaining Sub-national Constitutional Space’ (2011) 115 Penn 
State Law Rev. 1133; Robert F Williams, ‘Teaching and Researching Sub-national 
Constitutional Law’ (2011) 115 Penn State Law Rev. 1109; Jonathan Marshfield, 
‘Models of Sub-national Constitutionalism’ (2011) 115 Penn State Law Review, 1151; 
Tsegaye Regassa, ‘Sub-national Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards Entrenching 
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Williams, and Josef Marko, eds, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutions, and Minority 
Rights Westport, CT: Praeger 2004.; Giacomo Delledonne and Giuseppe Martinico, 
‘Exploring Subnational Constitutionalism: A Special Issue’ (2012) 4(2) Perspectives 





140                                           MIZAN LAW REVIEW                            Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013 
     
identity) is asserted, contested and utilized. As such, it is the realm in which, 
among other things, sub-national entities’ constitutive authority as distinct 
demos is made visible. The quest for sub-national constitutional space can thus 
be understood as a quest for ‘big laws in smaller places’. While sub-national 
constitutions2 continue to be relatively more invisible in constitutional legal 
studies, there is a steady increase in recent years in scholarly engagement with 
the field. This engagement with the sub-national space is the focus of the book 
under review here, the book edited by the Michael Burgess and G Alan Tarr. 
In what qualifies for a boost to an emerging sub-field of comparative 
federalism, (i.e., comparative sub-national constitutional law), Michael Burgess 
and G Alan Tarr have offered us their contribution to a better understanding of 
the dynamics in the relationship between the national and the sub-national levels 
of government. This edited volume seeks to explore the interplay between the 
national, subnational, and (in the case of European federations) supranational 
states and governments. It aims at looking “at the constitutional architecture of 
[federal] systems from ‘below’ ” (p.3). By noting the attempt to understand 
federal systems from the perspective of the federal government as top down in 
approach and incomplete in grasp, the volume emphasizes the importance of the 
bottom up approach adopted in this volume. In so doing, it seeks to explain, 
among other things, “how sub-national constitutional autonomy in federal states 
and federal or quasi-federal political systems” have changed their development 
(p.20) and “how and why [these systems] have managed to evolve and adapt in 
both similar and different directions” (p.20). In order to achieve its objective, it 
raises four major questions to which it responds through analytical chapters that 
explore twelve case studies. The four questions relate to: (1) what space (i.e., 
discretion) constituent units have to design their own constitutional institutions 
                                           
2 The term ‘Sub-national constitution’ is used to refer to constitutions and constitution-
like fundamental texts that govern the sub-national space. Thus, they are known as 
state constitutions in countries such as USA, Australia, Ethiopia, Mexico, etc. They 
are referred to as Provincial constitutions in countries such as South Africa. The term 
is also used to refer to Statutes of Autonomy as in Spain or Regional Statutes as in 
Italy). These latter ones, especially the ones in Spain, are also referred to as ‘internal 
constitutions’. See, for example, Jaoquim Sole Vilanova, “Spain: Developments in 
regional and Local Government,” in Robert J Bennet, ed, Territory and 
Administration in Europe. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989, pp. 205, 209-13. See 
also Eduardo Ruiz Viyetez, “Federalism, Sub-national Constitutional Arrangements, 
and Protection of Minorities in Spain,” in G Alan Tarr, Robert Williams, and Josef 
Marko, eds, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutions, and Minority Rights Westport, 
CT: Praeger 2004. It is also employed in reference to the ‘Basic Laws’ of Hong Kong 
and of Macau (Special Administrative Regions [alias SARs] of the Peoples’ Republic 
of China). See Paulo Cardinal and Yihe Zhang, ‘Sub-national Constitutionalism in the 
SARs of the Peoples’ Republic of China: an Exceptional Tailored Suit Model?’ (2012) 
4 (2) Perspectives on Federalism (Special issue), E 101-147. 
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and the extent to which the boundary of that space is policed; (2) what factors 
influence sub-national constitutions; (3) why sub-national units occupy or fail to 
occupy spaces available to them; and (4) what consequences emerge from this 
for horizontal and vertical intergovernmental relations (p.7). 
This book is a collection of thirteen essays in total. The essays other than the 
introduction constitute selected case studies from federal and quasi-federal 
jurisdictions. The consideration of sub-national constitutions and the dynamics 
thereof in territorial, multinational, regionalist, and supranational federations is 
discussed one after the other in four parts. Prefaced by Rupak Chattopadhyay, 
President of the Forum of Federations, the volume starts with a scene setting 
introduction by the editors. After this broad introduction that also summarizes 
and wonderfully connects the thread that runs across all the contributions come 
the case-specific essays presented under four rubrics.  
America’s state constitutions and those of the Lander in Germany and 
Austria (all three of which are described as ‘territorially based federations’) are 
treated under the first part.  Part II presents the experience in four multinational 
federations (namely that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Switzerland, Belgium, and 
Canada). In part III, we are presented with the experience of three territorially 
decentralized unitary states namely that of the United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Italy. In part IV, sub-national constitutionalism and constitutional development 
is discussed in the context of a supranational federal system, i.e., the European 
Union. In all the twelve cases presented, the authors tell the story of sub-
national constitutional space in a diverse array of federal and/or quasi federal 
settings and suggestively remind us of the dynamics in other federal systems.  
In federal systems, the volume seems to suggest, intergovernmental relations 
is ultimately a function of inter-constitutional dynamics. This in turn suggests to 
us that we need to trace, track, and have an understanding of sub-national 
constitutions. This act of tracing and tracking, this act of locating sub-national 
constitutions, is more than deciding whether there is a single codified 
constitutional text. Such constitutions come in many forms other than what we 
conventionally understand by the term ‘constitution’.  
From the pieces in the volume we learn that our sensibility of tracing sub-
national constitutions  – of locating big laws in smaller spaces – gets refined 
when we note that they might be embedded (or even hidden) in the federal/ 
national constitution, or in federal legislation dealing with general or specific 
matters in the realm of sub-national and local governments, or in acts of state 
legislatures (state legislatures ‘talking back’, or ‘speaking up’ as it were), or in 
unwritten constitutional conventions and practices (where such practices are 
sedimented enough to constitute a legal norm), etc. 
While the articles from each contributor are free standing, independent, and 
shedding some light on the dynamics of specific countries taken as case studies, 
the book has no problem of incoherence or lack of mutual intelligibility among 
the contributions. This is primarily because of the introductory chapter that not 
 
 
142                                           MIZAN LAW REVIEW                            Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013 
     
only sets the tone for the book (and aptly and summarily captures the 
contentions of each chapter) but also because of the connecting thread that links 
each contribution through the questions analysed. And this is irrespective of the 
difference in the process that led to the federal system (coming together, or 
holding together), the purpose it was negotiated for (accommodation/recognition 
of diversity, or administrative efficiency), modes of governing/policing the sub-
national space (through say, the use of the federal constitution, federal laws and 
administrative regulations; through enforcing constitutional supremacy; through 
parliamentary check for consistency; through litigation in constitutional/ 
supreme courts; through political negotiation and consultation, etc) or the 
political context, or the legal tradition. 
For a volume with a strong accent on its comparative reach, the omission of 
cases from beyond the transatlantic community3 (Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America)  might make it less complete but not less instructive even to those 
federations that are not covered in the volume. The fact that African federations 
(such as South Africa and Ethiopia) are only tangentially mentioned but not 
discussed extensively is unfortunate. Discussion on these federations would 
have explored the potential of the sub-national constitutional space as a site of 
negotiating recognition of diversity, plurinationality, and ‘internal nationhood’. 
Sub-national constitutions’ potential for institutionalizing recognition is 
underexplored particularly in postcolonial Africa. 
The Ethiopian reader who flips through the pages would be surprised by the 
points made about Ethiopia in two places (pp.12, and 37) where the editors 
mention Ethiopia as an example of federal systems in which broader sub-
national space is conceded by the ‘center’ as an incentive for the constituent 
units to join the federation: Another sentence on Ethiopia reads: “the Oromo 
Liberation Front agreed to cease armed resistance and join the Ethiopian 
Federation only after the constituent states were guaranteed the right to secede” 
(p.12).  
The editors allude to Yonatan T Fessha’s PhD Thesis “Institutional 
Recognition and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: Federalism in South 
Africa and Ethiopia” (2008) as their source. Considering the fact that the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) joined the transitional government in pre-Charter 1991 
with all its arms (i.e., immediately after the collapse of the Derg); and 
considering that it was back in armed insurgency as the constitution was being 
drafted and adopted between 1992 and 1994; and considering the continued 
armed resistance even after the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, the 
comment about Ethiopia is rather intriguing. 
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Nevertheless, the criticism about its comparative reach being restricted to 
Euro-America should not discount the critical importance of the volume to any 
study of ‘federalism from below.’ Similarly, the comment about the inaccuracies 
regarding Ethiopia is not so much a criticism as it is a point about the limits of 
doing comparative constitutional law ‘from a distance’ relying only on secondary 
sources.                                                                                                      ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
